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Abstract 
Critical explanations of neoliberalism regularly adhere to a dominant narrative as to the form and 
implementation of the neoliberal policy revolution, positing neoliberalism in its vanguard period 
as a project implemented by governments of the New Right, imposed coercively on civil society 
by state elites and only subsequently adopted by social democratic parties. In such accounts, 
labour is typically posited as the object and victim of neoliberalising processes. In contrast, this 
paper focuses upon the active role of labour within the development of neoliberalism. The 
period of social democratic government in Australia (1983–1996) is used as a case study to 
illuminate labour’s active role in constructing neoliberalism. Indicative evidence from the USA 
and UK is then presented to argue that the agency of labour can usefully be ‘written in’ to the 
presently dominant narrative regarding the rise of neoliberalism to provide a more satisfactory 
account of its nature and resilience over time.  
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Critical explanations of neoliberalism often frame the conservative governments of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as exemplars of the roll-out of neoliberalism more generally at a 
global level. This has contributed to a dominant narrative as to the form and implementation of 
the neoliberal policy revolution. It posits that neoliberalism in its vanguard period was a project 
of governments of the New Right, imposed coercively on civil society by state elites, and only 
subsequently adopted by social democratic parties. This dominant narrative has created an ideal 
type against which scholars view and assess neoliberalism in other locations. In so doing, it has 
obscured the uneven geographical neoliberal development of neoliberalism by missing specific 
instances of neoliberalisation that do not fit neatly into this conceptual framing. The dominant 
narrative emphasises the agency of states and neoliberal intellectuals in the construction of 
neoliberalism, and casts the role of ‘others’—especially labour—as the object and victims of 
those processes.  
 
Re-examining neoliberalism’s origins from the vantage point of the wake of the 2008 economic 
crisis, helps elucidate how explanations of neoliberalism may have been constrained and limited.  
This article argues that the dominant interpretive frame has narrowed our understanding of 
neoliberalism, in particular by ignoring the active role of labour organisations. We examine the 
role demarcated for labour in the dominant narrative. Within such a narrative, labour is typically 
viewed as the object of neoliberalism, with states (and New Right governments in particular) 
typically cast as the active subject. Organised labour is portrayed as the victim, with emphasis 
placed on the suppression of trade union organising and the intensified exploitation of labour. 
While agreeing that the neoliberal transformation of states and economies entailed a weakening 
of the power of organised labour and an increase in the rate of labour exploitation, this paper 
focuses instead upon the active role of labour, broadly conceived, within this process. This paper 
argues that the agency of labour can usefully be ‘written in’ to the present narrative to provide a 
more satisfactory account of the development of neoliberalism in the wake of the collapse of the 
post-world-war-two economic order.  
 
The analysis is developed in three sections. Section one outlines the dominant narrative and 
evidences this by examining two influential accounts: David Harvey’s A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (2005) and Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (2007).  
 
Section two examines a national case study that suggests a contrary narrative: the trajectory of 
the initial phase of neoliberalism in Australia, between 1983 and 1996. Recent scholarship on 
neoliberalism from critical social geography and critical international political economy 
emphasises its ‘variegated’ (Brenner et al., 2010; Macartney, 2010) nature. By this is meant not 
simply the uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, which is empirically observable, 
and, in and of itself, unremarkable. Rather it is to claim that ‘neoliberalisation processes’ result in 
‘systemic production of geoinstitutional differentiation’ (Brenner et al., 2010: 184). Indeed, Peck 
and Theodore argue that ‘crucial to understanding neoliberalism…[is] the distinctive spatiality of 
neoliberalism’ (2012: 177). An examination of Australia reveals one such distinct spatiality in the 
uneven development of neoliberalism. In that location, vanguard neoliberalism was implemented 
by a social democratic labour government, and in a context of a long-term consensual social 
contract between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the trade union movement. Our analysis 
emphasises the agency of labour in the neoliberal revolution in Australia. We argue that the 
organisational leadership of the labour movement and the ALP were the key forces within the 
state that made neoliberalism in that context, and that this represents a blind-spot in scholarly 
analyses of neoliberalism of the period, many of which are reluctant to view labour as one of the 
key agents in the creation of neoliberalism. 
 
Yet, if there is a variegated character and distinct and constitutive spatiality to neoliberalisation, is 
it also the case that there is a neoliberal ‘metalogic’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002), or ‘constitutive 
connections and family resemblances’ (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 183–184) between distinct and 
contextually specific instances of neoliberalisation? Section three presents indicative evidence 
suggesting that the involvement of labour in the development of neoliberalism is not an 
Australian-specific phenomenon, and that the political and industrial wings of the labour 
movement were active in constructing the early phases of neoliberalisation in both Britain and 
the USA, where, most accounts tend to assume, neoliberalism’s origins lie instead in the election 
of the conservative governments of Thatcher and Reagan. In doing so this article aims to ‘make 
arguments that urge the reader to see old problems in a new light’ (Skocpol, 1979). 
 
Dominant narratives of neoliberalism 
While recent literature argues neoliberalism takes diverse forms (Brenner et al., 2010; Harvey, 
2005), critical accounts of vanguard neoliberalism often privilege a particular narrative as to its 
origin and development. This narrative posits that the global origin of neoliberalism was its 
implementation via governments of the Right (in Chile, New York City, the UK and US) and 
that only subsequently did social democratic parties adopt it. Moreover, neoliberalism is viewed 
predominantly as a coercive project, involving direct state compulsion, defeat of trade union 
resistance through iconic confrontations, imposition of structural adjustment in the global South, 
and use of shock or crisis to impose change. This section substantiates the claim of a dominant 
narrative through examining two influential accounts: David Harvey’s seminal and highly cited 
analysis in A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005) and Naomi Klein’s widely read account in The 
Shock Doctrine (2007). The article then turns to a consideration of the ‘Accord’ in Australia, the 
examination of which, we argue, suggests the need to rethink the accuracy of the dominant 
interpretation of neoliberalism and its origins. 
 
David Harvey: A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism David Harvey argues that neoliberalism is a project to restore 
class power, made possible by capital and national states, in the wake of global economic crisis 
and social conflict of the 1960s and early 1970s. Harvey’s account of vanguard neoliberalism is 
principally the story of neoliberalism’s development in Chile, through to the New York City 
Council fiscal crisis, and then by the conservative governments led by Ronald Reagan in the USA 
and Margret Thatcher in the UK. These four locations form the cornerstone of his investigation. 
He argues that, inspired and influenced by the intellectual efforts of the Mont Pelerin Society and 
University of Chicago economists, Reagan and Thatcher led governments that implemented the 
neoliberal shift in two of the largest economies globally. Reagan and Thatcher ‘seized on the 
clues they had (from Chile and New York City) and placed themselves at the head of a class 
movement that was determined to restore its power’ (2005: 63) across the globe. They ‘plucked 
from the shadows of relative obscurity a particular doctrine that went under the name of 
‘neoliberalism’ and transformed it into the central guiding principle of economic thought and 
management’ (Harvey, 2005: 2). Harvey argues the ‘first experiment with neoliberal state 
formation’ in Chile, in the wake of the Pinochet coup on 11 September 1973, was achieved 
through the US’s central role in overthrowing the Allende government and the influence of ‘the 
Chicago boys’ when they were ‘summoned to help reconstruct the Chilean economy’ (2005: 8). 
He contends that while a map of neoliberalisation is difficult to construct because of the only 
partial progress made in most countries, nonetheless ‘the UK and the US led the way’ (2005: 88). 
 
Harvey draws a distinction between the introduction of neoliberalism by dictatorships (in Chile 
and Argentina specifically), and its democratic introduction after 1979 by Thatcher and Reagan. 
He argues the introduction of neoliberalism in those locations was achieved through the 
construction of consent, and draws on Gramsci’s notion of ‘common-sense’ to argue consent 
was developed through various ideological and cultural mechanisms constructed on the material 
basis of the experience of daily life under capitalism in the 1970s (Harvey, 2005: 40–41). Central 
to his analysis of how consent was constructed, however, are acts of state coercion. Harvey sees 
the disciplining of labour by Thatcher and Reagan through economic policy and the provocation 
of major industrial disputes as fundamental to their ability to introduce neoliberal reforms. 
Reagan defeated the PATCO union when he fired 11,359 striking air traffic controllers and jailed 
their union leaders in 1981, despite promising in 1980s to work cooperatively with the union 
(who supported his election) over industrial and safety matters (Harvey, 2005: 25, 59). In March 
1984 Thatcher provoked a confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers, by 
announcing a wave of redundancies and pit closures (Harvey, 2005: 59). The strike lasted for a 
year, until 5 March 1985, and despite widespread public support for the striking miners, was won 
by the Thatcher government (Davidson, 2010: 36–37; Harvey, 2005: 59). Thus, although Harvey 
argues the introduction in the US and UK was based on consent vis a vis the introduction under 
the Chilean and Argentinean dictatorships, it is a narrative that simultaneously argues that labour 
in both locations had to be disciplined and their unions defeated, coercively, as part of the 
establishment of neoliberalism in those countries.  
 
Harvey argues that following the introduction of neoliberalism in these locations, all states have 
‘embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some 
version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly’ (2005: 
3). He assigns, for the largest part, a passive role to social democratic parties, and makes only 
limited reference to neoliberal reforms introduced by them. Moreover, he does not consider 
locations where the introduction of neoliberalism in the early 1980s was accomplished by such 
political formations — such as its implementation by labour governments in Australia and New 
Zealand (July 1984 – November 1990). Further, in Harvey’s discussion of the Third Way 
approach of the governments of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, on the one hand there is emphasis 
on the passivity of social democratic formations whilst on the other an emphasis on the policy 
constraints faced by such parties in the wake of the implementation of neoliberalism by earlier 
governments of the Right. Harvey argues that the greatest testimony to the success of 
neoliberalism in democratic countries is that it resulted in the more progressive governments that 
followed Reagan and Thatcher finding ‘themselves in a situation where their room for 
manoeuvre was so limited that they could not help but sustain the process of restoration of class 
power even against their own better instincts’ (2005: 62–63). He argues that the ‘genius [of 
Reagan and Thatcher] was to create a legacy and a tradition that tangled subsequent politicians in 
a web of constraints from which they could not easily escape. Those who followed, like Clinton 
and Blair, could do little more than continue the good work of neoliberalisation, whether they 
liked it or not’ (2005: 63).  
 
Harvey typically frames the struggles against neoliberalism by the labour movement as a valiant 
but unsuccessful opponent of the inexorable realities of the neoliberal era and the power of 
states and capital (2005: 198–201). At only one point in A Brief History does he criticise the 
movement itself, for ‘rudderless’ direction and ‘self-inflicted wounds’ arising out of an embrace 
of identity politics and postmodern intellectual currents (2005: 198). Such rare passages 
notwithstanding, Harvey’s chief narrative is that neoliberalism was imposed upon labour and that 
Third Way governments inherited an already entrenched neoliberal institutional architecture that 
had been implemented by conservative regimes, leaving the later-governing social democrats 
with little choice but to submit to the neoliberal agenda. 
 
Through selective analyses of the rise of neoliberalism in Chile, the USA and the UK, Harvey 
establishes an ideal-type of the origins and trajectory of neoliberalism. This ideal-type narrows 
our understanding of neoliberalism and its diverse manifestations. It posits social democratic 
governments as forms of rule unable to manoeuvre outside the constraints of an already 
established neoliberalism, and eschews the role of the Labour parties of New Zealand and 
Australia — and the labour movement in the case of the latter — in developing and 
implementing neoliberalism in the early to mid-1980s. 
 
Naomi Klein: The Shock Doctrine 
Naomi Klein’s description of the development of neoliberalism in The Shock Doctrine (2007) 
argues that nation states have used disasters of various kinds to transform society and implement 
neoliberal policies. As a guide to how neoliberalism was rolled out in practice she cites Milton 
Friedman’s argument that ‘only a crisis — actual or perceived — produces real change [and that 
when] a crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around’ 
(Friedman, 1962: xiv; Klein, 2007: 140). Klein ‘sees neoliberalism as the manifestation of the 
inner logic of corporate capitalism and “shock” as the means by which it can be realised’ 
(Davidson, 2010: 16). For Klein, such shock therapy is part of a political ‘counter-revolution’ 
against the Keynesianism and social ‘compromise’ effected during the long boom. She provides 
an ideas-centred account of neoliberalism, where Friedman and those trained in the neoclassical 
tradition worked within governments and used political and economic crisis, as well as natural 
disasters, in order to implement and extend neoliberal restructuring.  
 
Klein argues the origins of neoliberal ‘shock-therapy’ are to be found in the ‘laissez-faire 
laboratory’ of the Pinochet coup in Chile in 1973 (2007: 75–87). Similarly to Harvey, she sees the 
implementation of neoliberalism by Thatcher as a process of its transition to a democratic 
footing — and argues neoliberalism, eventually hated by the British public, was ‘saved’ by the 
manufactured shock of the Falklands War (Klein, 2007: 131–141). Klein also examines the rise 
of ‘disaster capitalism’ through the late 1980s and up to the present through various other shocks 
including natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina, the disintegration of the Soviet Union after 
1989, and the invasion and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prominent in Klein’s account is her 
observation that neoliberalism does not enjoy common assent and it has come about by a 
coercive process of forcing economic change on populations at moments where social resistance 
is unlikely to develop. For Klein, neoliberalism is to a significant extent built on secret and 
hidden processes. 
 
There are a number of problems with Klein’s approach, some of which result from her 
acceptance of the dominant narrative as to how neoliberalism is introduced and others which 
result from her thesis of ‘shock’ as turning points (Krinsky, 2011). In understanding 
neoliberalism as the ideological defeat of Keynesian ideas (Klein and Smith, 2008: 584), she 
limits her analysis to those locations where New Right governments enacted it in the 1970s and 
1980s. This fails to acknowledge how neoliberalism was introduced by social democratic parties 
in the vanguard neoliberal era, but also fails to explain examples of crisis after WWII where 
neoliberalism was not implemented (Davidson, 2009: 168). In the case of the former she fails to 
account for why neoliberal restructuring took place in some locations without shocks (such as 
Australia), and in the case of the latter why greatly different economic policies were followed in 
various US backed coups (e.g. Indonesia in 1965 in comparison to Chile in 1973). While Klein 
usefully highlights how politics can shift quickly in situations of social crisis, this is more 
generally true of the history of capitalism and fails to provide specificity to an understanding of 
the development of neoliberalism. 
 
Destabilising the dominant narrative 
In according analytical primacy to the experience of Reaganism and Thatcherism, and seeing 
neoliberalism as involving a transmission from the Global North to the Global South, scholarly 
analysis has, we argue, narrowed how we understand neoliberalism. The tendency detected by 
Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010: 189) with respect to the interpretation of neoliberalism 
within the varieties of capitalism literature is true of the dominant narrative in critical 
examinations of neoliberalism more generally, whereby, in treating ‘neoliberalisation in ideal-
typical terms, as a national regime type, it offers little analytical insight into the evolutionary 
trajectories of neoliberalising reform projects and their institutional expressions’. 
 
Following Connell and Dados (2014), we contend scholarly understanding of neoliberalism can 
be enhanced by looking at the development of neoliberalism in locations and actors outside 
those that dominate current accounts. We posit that, when alternative stories of the development 
of neoliberalism are examined, a different set of neoliberal dynamics is illuminated.  
 
One such dynamic, we contend, is the active and consensual role of labour in the production of 
neoliberalism in the period of the late 1970s and 1980s. The next section examines one case in 
which the active role of labour in the construction of neoliberalism seems clear — Australia’s 
longest period of social democratic government between 1983 and 1996. Yet this case is one that 
is ignored by Harvey and Klein, and certainly doesn’t fit within the ideal type that emerges from 
their accounts of the origins and development of neoliberalism. In turn, our analysis highlights 
‘the strategic role of national, regional and local state apparatuses as active progenitors of 
neoliberalising institutional reforms and prototypes, and as arenas in which market-oriented, 
regulatory experiments are initiated, consolidated and even extended’ (Brenner et al., 2010: 196). 
 
Neoliberalism and labour in Australia  
At the 1983 Australian federal election the ALP won office in the depths of the worst economic 
crisis since the Great Depression, and set about radically changing the political economic 
landscape. The Labor government implemented a bipartite social contract it had recently signed 
with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the national trade union federation. The 
agreement immediately halted wage growth by indexing it to inflation, and agreed to protect 
living standards through enhancement of the social wage. Simultaneously, the ALP instigated a 
series of vanguard neoliberal policies including financial deregulation and the floating of the 
national currency. These processes are predominantly understood in the scholarly literature as 
counter-posed and antithetical corporatist and neoliberal projects (Ahlquist, 2011; Peetz, 2013; 
Spies-Butcher, 2012). In contrast, however, the argument developed here is that there was a 
concord, or harmony, between these two transformative policy regimes. We posit that the social 
contract was the form neoliberalism took in Australia in its initial phase. In this section we 
overview how neoliberalism became hegemonic through the Accord, with a focus on its 
consensual implementation. We argue that neoliberalism resulted not from a failure or inability 
of the trade unions to fight its progress in Australia, but rather that neoliberalism was embedded 
within the corporatist project and actively constructed by both the industrial and political wings 
of organised labour.  
 
The content of the Accord and Australian neoliberalism 
The Statement of Accord Between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Regarding Economic Policy (‘the Accord’) was the ‘primary statement of domestic economic policy’ 
during the 13 years of Labor government between 1983 to 1996 (Ahlquist, 2011: 133). In return 
for real wages remaining static through centralised wage indexation, the Accord promised to 
hold down prices and non-wage incomes and institute social wage improvements and tax reform 
— ‘a framework of policy measures directed at alleviating unemployment and redistributing 
income and wealth to the less well-off’ (ALP & ACTU, 1986). Its aim was to promote economic 
growth through central coordination and simultaneously reduce inflation and improve living 
standards through an increased social product.  
 
The Accord contained an agreement upon policy details that can be described broadly as 
interventionist, expansionary and progressive. This included: moderation of prices, wages and 
non-wage incomes; a commitment to improved working conditions and progressive industrial 
relations legislation; socially equitable taxation; increased government expenditure; industry 
development policy; improved social security benefits; and, progressive education and health 
reforms. The parties argued it would be through consensual planning that the Accord ‘would 
enable attainment of currently unobtainable objectives’ (ibid) of growth, full employment and 
lower inflation. Living standards would be improved immediately through an expanded social 
wage, and over time through compensation ‘to reflect the distribution of improved output as 
measured by national productivity’ (ibid).  
 
Prima facie, then, the Accord seems a long way from neoliberalism, and indeed, a repudiation of 
some of the kinds of neoliberal policies being pursued contemporaneously by conservative 
governments in Britain and the USA. Certainly, this is how it has most often been reviewed, 
indicative of which is Wright’s (2014: 6) assessment that ‘the Accord represented a more 
equitable alternative to the neoliberal approaches of the Thatcher government and its 
counterparts in the United States and New Zealand and elsewhere’. As will be demonstrated, 
however, the Accord proved central to the extensive neoliberalisation of the Australian state and 
economy during the decade and a half of Labor governance.  
 
The Accord was reconstituted through national wage cases and renegotiated terms between the 
parties over the next 13 years, in eight ‘editions’ (Mark I-VIII). The editions quickly narrowed to 
focus almost exclusively on wages, culminating in the radical industrial reforms of 1993 that 
abolished much of the centralised wage process and introduced enterprise bargaining. A limited 
number of social wage promises were delivered (Hancock, 2014: 280), most particularly the 
reinstitution of universal or moderate cost access to most health services and the extension of 
the superannuation compulsory retirement savings scheme to the whole workforce from 1992. 
Conversely, many significant policy elements were not implemented including: the maintenance 
of real wages; action on moderating prices and non-wage incomes; progressive taxation; and, 
public expenditure increases at pledged levels. In fact, adjusted for inflation public expenditure 
increases were less than those delivered by the conservative governments that preceded and 
followed this ALP government (Laurie and McDonald, 2008). 
 
Shortly after the election of the ALP government the policy framework departed from that set 
out in the Accord. In the month after Labor’s 1983 victory it convened a national economic 
summit, and the resultant ‘tripartite’ communiqué moved away from the commitments between 
the ALP and ACTU (Stilwell, 1986: 11–15). In the same period the government also signed a 
free trade agreement with New Zealand, titled the Closer Economic Relations Agreement, 
undermining a promise to consult with Australian Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union given 
its impact on the sector (Carmichael, 1983). By the end of the year the government had floated 
the Australian Dollar, and within two years the banking sector had been deregulated. As Bowden 
(2011: 69) notes, ‘the new government adopted a neo-liberal agenda’. Crucially, in the second 
year of the Accord the Government adopted a framework it termed ‘the trilogy’. This committed 
the government not to increase taxation, government expenditure, or the size of the budget 
deficit, as a percentage of gross domestic product. The trilogy was a ‘self-imposed fiscal 
straightjacket’ (Stilwell, 1986: 15) and sharply moved from the expansionary commitments and 
social wage promises of the Accord. As the period progressed, free tertiary education was 
abolished and taxation, which was to be progressively reformed to ensure corporations paid a 
‘fair share’, moved in the opposite direction. Other neoliberal measures implemented by Labor 
and often supported by the union leadership included restrictive monetary policy, extensive 
industry deregulation, privatisation of public assets, corporatisation of government departments, 
dismantling of tariff protections and promotion of ‘free trade’, tendering for previously publicly 
provided services, and the increased targeting of welfare assistance. Throughout this period, 
industrial activity declined markedly partly due to the Accord’s centralised negotiations, but also 
because the ACTU policed member unions to comply when attempts were made by workers to 
move outside the centralised wage indexation as real wages fell (McEvoy and Owens, 1990; 
Sheehan and Jennings, 2010: 145–194). Under the Accord the income and wealth gap between 
the most and least well off also widened (Frijters and Gregory, 2006). Thus, by the end of 
Australia’s longest ever period of social democratic governance, a radical neoliberal restructuring 
of the state and economy had been affected and it was at least as nationally far-reaching as the 
contemporaneous neoliberal changes made under Reagan and Thatcher. 
 
Certainly this did not follow the same temporal sequence, nor did it assume that same form, as 
the neoliberal transformations presided over by conservative regimes in Britain or the USA. Yet 
this perhaps merely underscores the uneven and ‘variegated’ (Brenner et al., 2010; Macartney, 
2010) character of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Cahill, 2014; 
Peck and Tickell, 2002; Wacquant, 2012). Nor did it follow the fundamentalist prescriptions of 
neoliberal theorists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Yet, as several authors have 
highlighted (Cahill, 2014; Peck and Tickell, 2002), it is important to distinguish between the 
normative ideals of neoliberal theory, and the ways in which neoliberal transformations have 
manifested in practice. Therefore, that the roll out of neoliberal policies in Australia was 
implemented alongside the construction of institutions (such as Medicare and corporatism) that 
would seem anathema to doctrinaire neoliberals, is not sufficient reason to regard the Accord 
period as a break with neoliberalisation. 
 
Labour’s active role in neoliberalism in Australia 
The Accord is predominantly viewed in the scholarly literature as a form of corporatism and a 
method of economic management distinct from, and in competition with, neoliberalism. This is 
true even of many analyses that are critical of the Accord for its failure to implement its 
promised reforms. In contrast however, we argue that although the Accord was a corporatist 
framework, fitting the archetype outlined by Leo Panitch (1977, 1981), it was nonetheless part of 
the form that neoliberalism took in Australia and central to the roll-out of neoliberal policies. In 
reflecting on the corporatist experience in Europe after the Second World War, Panitch argued 
that in ‘virtually every liberal democratic country in which corporatist structures become at all 
important an incomes policy designed to abate the wage pressure of trade unions was the 
frontispiece of corporatist development’ (1977: 74). It is here, in the efforts of corporatism and 
neoliberalism to increase labour exploitation, that we locate one of the key points of concord 
between the Australian social contract and neoliberalism.  
 
While some of the literature on the Accord acknowledges and discusses the extensive neoliberal 
reforms undertaken by the ALP government, the Accord has been predominantly posited as a 
social-democratic exercise mobilised or buttressed against such policies. It has been understood 
as an alternative economic plan designed to, in various combinations: a) buffer the advance of 
neoliberalism at a time of protracted economic crisis and in a period in which resistance was not 
possible or could not possibly succeed; b) protect worker’s wages and enhance the social wage in 
lieu of wage increases as the economy recovered; and c) limit the growth of inequality compared 
to others nations implementing neoliberalism in the 1980s. 
 
For example, Spies-Butcher argues that it was an approach where ‘collaboration combined with a 
more pragmatic approach to “economic rationalism” [a common Australian synonym for 
neoliberalism]’ and that the ALP achieved ‘a pragmatic accommodation between markets and 
equity’ (2012: 208). Peetz similarly argues that the period was one with ‘no uniformity of 
thought...[and where] market liberalism and the modified Keynesianism of the Accord’ 
competed for choice in policy development. The political process was such that ‘sometimes one 
idea won out, sometimes the other idea did’ (2013).  
 
Cottle and Collins (2010: 34) also deny that Labor’s transformations of the state amounted to a 
form of neoliberalism. Rather, they argue that because the Labor government’s radical 
transformations of the state and economy were ‘carried out with the formal approval of the peak 
representative body of organised labour’, and because the Accord agreements did not contain 
any formal commitments to ‘the class goals of capital expressed in radical neoliberal ideology’ 
that the period is better described as ‘Neo-Laborism, the pragmatic regulatory logic which 
reconciled the conflict between laborism and electoralism which had plagued all former ALP 
governments in office’. 
 
Pierson makes a closely related point when he argues that although the ‘reputation of the ALP 
under [successive Labor Prime-Ministers] Hawke and Keating [was] as the first neoliberal labour 
government’, this judgement is ‘too straightforward’ (2002: 184). He argues that while 
‘Canberra’s policy making and opinion formation did come increasingly under the direction of 
“economic rationalists”’, there was not the ‘wholesale assault upon welfare provision that 
marked out neoliberal governments (at least in aspiration) elsewhere’ (ibid 2002: 184). Pierson 
thus characterises the Accord period as ‘social democracy on the back foot’. Nonetheless, 
Pierson questions, whether the differences between Australia and its counterparts — in 
Thatcherism, Reaganism and Rogernomics — offer, quoting Wiseman, ‘only the prospect of a 
“kinder road to hell”’(2002: 188). Ultimately Pierson concludes that the differences in policy 
implemented by Hawke and Keating and ‘the real neoliberals’ that succeeded them in the 
Coalition Government, are ‘not unambiguously differences of kind rather than of degree’ (2002: 
196). While Pierson recognises neoliberal elements within the policy program of successive 
Australian Labor governments, he is nonetheless reluctant to identify those governments as 
‘neoliberal’ because this label — to his mind it would seem — should be reserved for 
governments of the Right. Thus Pierson’s analysis accords with the dominant narrative regarding 
the development of neoliberalism: that ‘real’ neoliberalism is to be located in Reaganism and 
Thatcherism, against which other paths to neoliberalism are adjudicated. When this assumption 
that neoliberalism is, first and foremost, a project of governments of the Right which is then 
imposed on civil society, is set aside, then the commonalities between the introduction in 
Australia, the US and the UK come into sharper focus. 
 
The Accord as neoliberalism 
In contrast to those accounts which separate the Accord from neoliberal transformation in 
Australia, some authors argue that the ‘formal’ social contract also included an ‘informal Accord’ 
and that this facilitated the introduction of neoliberalism in Australia. The ‘informal Accord’ 
denotes the support given by the unions to the ALP, and the willingness of the unions to 
significantly compromise their political objectives to ensure ‘their’ government remained in 
power. Bramble and Kuhn (1999) highlight how ‘the formal and informal aspects of the Accord 
was to manage the neo-liberal transformation of state and economy by tying the leadership of 
the labour movement to this process’ (ibid 2008: 326). This approach has the advantage of 
understanding the wider political context and processes behind the Accord. The willingness of 
the ACTU and union officials to support the ALP, despite their concerns over the direction of 
government policy, constituted a submission to neoliberalism. Concurrently, the ACTU and 
leading unions also engaged in silencing dissent to the Accord framework and wider neoliberal 
reforms — either by actively working to prevent industrial action or by failing to assist and 
defend unions when they took industrial action. While the most prominent of these were the 
Pilots’ Dispute, where the ACTU acquiesced to the government’s use of the military as strike 
breakers, and the deregistration of the Builder’s Labourers Federation, such disciplinary 
measures were also imposed by the ACTU upon their members in various other industrial 
disputes (McPhillips, 1985).  
 
However, while the informal Accord framework emphasises how the Accord facilitated the 
development of neoliberalism by tying the unions to the Government’s priorities, it is also 
possible to take this argument further. The Accord institutionalised the trade union leadership 
within the apparatuses of the state. Through the Accord, the ACTU leadership enjoyed an 
‘unprecedented level of direct influence… over the policy process’ (Wright, 2014: 3). It was 
incorporated into the state through corporatist bipartite and tripartite bodies and, more broadly, 
it was incorporated in to the political project of neoliberalisation. The goal of this project was to 
restore conditions for profitable capital accumulation in response to the crisis that has beset the 
Australian and global capitalist economies since the 1970s. Certainly, as Collins and Cottle argue, 
this may have been born more of ‘pragmatism’ than ideology, but it was, nonetheless, clearly 
neoliberal in nature. In Australia, the union leadership played a central and active role in this 
project. 
 
One important way in which this occurred was industry development and technological change 
processes. The original social contract agreed to implement comprehensive industry 
development policy, with the ‘paramount objective’ being the ‘attainment of full employment’ 
through ‘interventionist’ industry planning. In practice, clauses related to keeping tariff 
protections were ignored and policy and funding was directed at technological adjustment to 
ensure industries were ‘viable’ in an increasingly less protected environment. In the case of the 
impact of the steel plan in Wollongong, for example, a focal point for both union militancy and 
the serious effects of unemployment in the midst of the crisis, the government and ‘the ACTU 
accepted BHP’s long-term strategy and supported the provision of hundreds of millions of 
taxpayers’ dollars to the company to invest in job-displacing technology’ (Southall, 2006: 9). As 
Julianne Shultz put it, the industry plan for steel was in fact a process to restructure the industry 
in Wollongong in accordance of the wishes of the major employer, BHP. Thus, ‘when [Prime 
Minister Bob] Hawke spoke of saving the steel industry, it was the salvation of the balance sheet 
he was talking about, a balance sheet that made no provision for the social impact of the 
restructuring’ (Schultz, 1985: 252). Although local unions fought the plan, they were ultimately 
brought in to line by the central union leadership and the threat of mass sackings in a town 
already ravaged by unemployment. Industry policy was, ultimately, a process that placed the 
unions inside the state efforts to restructure the economy along neoliberal lines. 
 
The Accord constructed a new form of political rule in the wake of the economic and social 
upheavals of the 1970s. Australian neoliberalism was constructed consensually, as a shared 
national project of economic management and political economic transformation, and involved 
labour directly through the trade union leadership. Neoliberalism in Australia was sold to the 
electorate as a positive consensual project of efficient economic management in the era of 
globalisation. Hancock’s (2014) identification of the crucial role played by the ACTU’s ‘strong 
leadership’ in ensuring that wage repression was achieved ‘without major resistance’ is applicable 
to the Accord’s role in the process of neoliberalisation more generally. It is not simply that the 
Accord assisted the introduction of neoliberal policies through its various effects, although it did 
have that result (see for example Buchanan et al., 2014: 301). Rather it is to argue that the 
agreement also embedded a consent for the neoliberal project to take place, with the Accord 
significantly weakening industrial solidarity leading to ‘not just deepening wage inequality, but the 
isolation of unions from a workforce increasingly subject to the vagaries of the market’) 
(Buchanan et al., 2014: 302). Dissent against the Accord and neoliberalism were not absent (see 
Strauss, 2013), rather, the ACTU’s active support for the neoliberal restructuring of the 
Australian state and economy, and the acquiescence of leading unions, ensured that such dissent 
remained marginal. The Accord and vanguard neoliberal reforms were not exogenous; rather the 
Accord was the form that the mode of neoliberal rule took in Australia. 
 
Labour and neoliberalism internationally   
So far it has been argued that labour — through the organisational leadership of the labour 
movement and the Labor Party — was a key force within the state that made neoliberalism in 
Australia, and that this occurred contemporaneously to the better-known examples of 
neoliberalisation carried out by the conservative Thatcher and Reagan administrations. This is in 
contradistinction to the dominant narrative regarding the rise of neoliberalism, which, 
generalising from the experiences of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes, posits that neoliberalism 
was imposed by conservative governments upon labour. The task now remains to ascertain 
whether the analysis presented of the development of neoliberalism in Australia is also applicable 
to other countries. Is it a uniquely Australian phenomenon or does it, instead, prompt a re-think 
of the narrative of neoliberal development and labour’s role within this, in other countries too?  
 
The most obvious example that suggests the Australian case study might be more generally 
applicable is that of its close neighbour, New Zealand. Here, there was a contemporaneous 
process of neoliberalisation driven by that country’s Labour Party in office (Kelsey, 1995, 2014; 
Roper, 2005). However, some might be inclined to attribute the parallel labour-driven 
neoliberalisation in Australia and New Zealand as deriving from Antipodean exceptionalism and 
as not being relevant for an explanation of the development of neoliberalism in the core 
capitalist countries. For the argument that labour made neoliberalism to have utility as an 
interpretive frame for understanding the dynamics of neoliberalism more generally, evidence 
would need to be found that labour was active in the creation of neoliberalism in the neoliberal 
heartlands of Britain and the USA, as well as in the antipodean periphery. 
 
In what follows we offer two broad examples as indicative evidence that labour was indeed an 
agent in the creation of neoliberalism in the core capitalist countries of the USA and Britain. Our 
argument is that labour’s active creation of neoliberalism in these countries pre-dates the well 
documented role that successive ‘third way’ New Labour governments played in the 
neoliberalisation of Britain from 1997-2010, and that the Democratic Presidency of Bill Clinton 
played in extending the process of neoliberalisation within the USA and indeed, throughout the 
global economy from 1993-2001. Indeed, the evidence we present below is indicative of labour 
being an agent in the roll out of neoliberalism prior to the Thatcher and Reagan administrations 
that have most often been identified as being in the vanguard of processes of neoliberalisation. 
 
Labour and the development of neoliberalism in 1970s USA 
One early instance of the roll out of neoliberalism in the USA was the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978. It was driven and signed into legislation by Democratic President Carter. Occurring prior 
to the better known neoliberal policies of the Reagan administration it has been described as ‘the 
first major rolling back of the New Deal’ (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998: 345). Moreover, it was 
President Carter who appointed Paul Volcker as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and 
it was during Carter’s term that the ‘Volcker shock’ began, as did the Fed’s experiment with 
monetarism, both considered to be key elements of the neoliberal agenda in the USA (Harvey, 
2005: 1–2). 
 
Nonetheless, despite the integration of organised labour within the US Democratic Party, it 
might be objected that the Democrats are not truly a ‘party of labour’, and therefore that such 
examples of neoliberalisation as occurred under the Carter regime fail to make the case 
sufficiently that labour helped to make neoliberalism. 
 
Concurrently, however, there were other developments within organised labour in the USA that 
provide indicative evidence supporting the thesis that labour was an active agent in the creation 
of neoliberalism. A striking feature of the political and economic landscape of the USA from the 
late 1960s, and extending through much of the 1970s, was the significant upsurge in labour 
militancy. It was, as Aaron Brenner argues, ‘one of the largest strike waves in US history, during 
which workers twice set records for the number of strikes in a single year’ (2010: xi). Perhaps 
even more noteworthy is that many such examples of militancy were of a ‘wildcat’ nature (i.e. 
they were not endorsed by the official trade union leadership).  
 
One possible explanation for the rise of neoliberalism in the USA, and indeed, elsewhere, is that 
neoliberalism was the response by employers and state elites to these mobilisations, and the 
means through which management was able to re-establish effective control over workplaces, 
and lower real unit labour costs in an era of intensified international competition. Alongside this, 
however, a different but complementary explanation of the rise of neoliberalism is possible.  
 
As Kim Moody argues, at the end of the 1970s, trade union leaders in the USA began to respond 
to the militant, wildcat upsurge from the broader trade union membership and ‘resisted the 
assault from the ranks on bureaucratic rule and increasingly sided with management in the 
restoration of workplace-authority and company-competitive priorities’ (2012: 6). As part of this 
response, union leaders struck deals with employers which eroded both the wages and working 
conditions of members. Crucial to this process, according to Moody, was the deal struck 
between the United Auto Workers and the management of the Chrysler Corporation ‘which 
opened the floodgates of concessionary bargaining’ (2010: 142). Importantly, this occurred both 
before the Carter government’s bailout of Chrysler, and before the more iconic PATCO dispute 
(op cit 2012: 6–7), in which the Reagan government was instrumental in defeating the strike by 
air traffic controllers, and which is most often singled-out in progressive accounts of the rise of 
neoliberalism in the USA.  
 
The labour movement therefore helped to make neoliberalism in the USA through its 
concessions to employers that ushered in the new template of lean production, granting 
management greater prerogatives over the labour process, a hallmark of the neoliberal era, as 
well as contributing to working class austerity. That this was a result of the imposition of 
neoliberalism upon the working class, and of defeats of the working class by capital and the state 
is not in question. What we are suggesting, in contrast, and in parallel, is that labour movement 
leaders were complicit in processes of workplace neoliberalisation through undercutting the 
organic mobilisations by workers against capital at the time, in the interests of maintaining or re-
securing the power and control of trade union leaders within and over the institutions of 
organised labour. It was thus essentially a ‘political choice’ (Moody, 2012: 6) by the labour 
movement leadership, not simply their defeat at the hands of capital, nor simply the imposition 
of austerity from above (important though both of these factors were), that ushered in processes 
of neoliberalisation in the USA from the 1970s onwards. 
 
British labour and neoliberalism, 1974–1979 
While the most radical and far-reaching neoliberalisation of the British state and economy 
undoubtedly occurred under the eleven years of the Prime-ministership of Margaret Thatcher, its 
antecedents are to be found in the actions of sections of the labour movement during the 1970s.  
 
Writing of the period of Labour in government from 1974–79, McIlroy argues that ‘scrutiny of 
Labour policies illustrates the need to see in Thatcherism continuity as well as change’ (1995: 
192). It was a period during which successive Labour governments responded to the twin 
challenges of a global economic crisis and the growing transnationalisation of capital, with 
austerity programs on the one hand, and proposals for a radical extension of social democracy 
and nationalisation on the other (Lambie, 2013). While the latter programme was more 
aspirational than real, it was the former austerity measures that provided some of the material 
policy precursors for the more widespread neoliberalisation of the Thatcher years.  
 
Labour’s austerity agenda included cuts to social spending, later combined with wage 
suppression. While it was the Parliamentary Labour Party that was directly responsible for the 
savage cuts to social expenditure, the agency of the labour movement leadership more broadly in 
such decisions is clear. Beyond the dominance enjoyed by trade unions at annual Labour Party 
national conferences, in 1972 a formal Trade Union-Labour Party liaison committee was 
developed which shaped subsequent policy (McIlroy, 1995: 187). With respect to wage 
suppression, the role of the trade union leadership was much more overt, joining with the labour 
government in an agreement to limit wage rises — ‘The Social Contract’ — to below the rate of 
inflation. This led to a generalised decline in real wages during the first three years of Labour’s 
period in office, and was described by Panitch (1981: 38) as ‘the most sustained and draconian 
reduction of real wages… in the post-war period’. Indeed, it was only when trade unions began 
to break from the Social Contract in 1977 that real wage gains were made.  
 
Nor should it be imagined that labour leaders were forced into such neoliberal measures by the 
need to secure IMF stabilisation funds. Certainly, there was pressure from the IMF for the 
Labour government to pursue a neoliberal macroeconomic agenda. Nonetheless, there was 
considerable internal dissent within the Labour Party and the labour movement more generally 
to the government’s neoliberal austerity agenda. Significant sections of the movement coalesced 
behind radical social democratic/socialist forms of crisis response (Lambie, 2013). Moreover, the 
later admission by Callaghan in a BBC interview that the ‘IMF was a useful screen’ — by which 
he goes on to clarify that the conditionalities of the IMF gave the government cover for the 
austerity program they felt necessary to implement anyway — suggests that he, and perhaps 
others in the Cabinet, felt neoliberal measures were necessary and enacted independent of any 
pressure brought to bear by the IMF (Cockerell, 1992). Indeed, Callaghan’s speech to the 1976 
Labour Party Conference was replete with statements that anticipated those made in subsequent 
years by his successor, Margaret Thatcher (Callaghan, 1976).  As Lambie writes of the 
government’s 1976 ‘IMF’ austerity’ program, 
 
 This monumental decision on the part of a major power, to acquiesce to the 
discipline of what were ultimately private capital interests was a defining moment in 
the development of globalisation and the rise of neoliberalism. It was also a serious 
blow to any aspiration of promoting democratic socialism in Britain (2013: 355). 
 
The period of 1974-1979 when Labour was in government in Britain thus presents a parallel with 
the period of Labor in government in Australia during the 1980s made 1990s. In each case the 
leadership of organized labour subordinated the immediate interests of its membership in the 
interests of maintaining support for a labour government. However, while this pattern largely 
continued (with a few notable exceptions, as discussed earlier) throughout the entire thirteen-
year period of Labor in office in Australia, in Britain this pattern was broken — temporarily at 
least — by the ‘Winter of Discontent’, when trade unions pursued higher wage outcomes directly 
with employers, rejecting the constraints imposed via the Social Contract. Moreover, it should be 
noted that, unlike in Australia during the Accord years, the Labour Party in Britain had, during 
its period in office, official commitments to a quite radical economic agenda. Indeed, after its 
election defeat at the hands of Thatcher in 1979 it turned even further to the Left. Yet, this was 
to prove a hiatus in the British Labour’s march towards neoliberalism. Labour’s disastrous 
election result of 1983 paved the way for the rise of Neil Kinnock, under whose leadership the 
party embarked on a strategy of ‘breaking labour from the lurch left and accepting key points of 
Thatcherism’ (McIlroy, 1995: 211). In longer view then, Lambie’s conclusion about the 
significance of Labour’s austerity agenda of the 1970s seems apposite: ‘Henceforth there was 
little opposition to the dismantling of the post-war consensus that followed when the 
Conservatives came to power under Thatcher in 1979… The election of Blair in 1997 marked 
the success of that project’ (2013: 357). 
 
By examining these three geographically and temporally specific instances of neoliberalisation, 
important ‘family resemblances’ emerge. In each instance, labour movements and labour parties 
were active in the creation of neoliberalism. To be sure, the particularities of each case were 
different. Moreover, it might be the case that this was a phenomenon unique to ‘uncoordinated 
liberal market economies’ which, due to similar inherited institutional architectures, ‘were less 
well equipped organisationally and institutionally than were coordinated market economies to 
manage the crisis-tendencies of Atlantic Fordism, and… provided more fertile ground for the 
rise of neoliberalism (Jessop, 2002: 457).   
 
Nonetheless, it prompts a re-evaluation of the nature of, and forces driving neoliberalism more 
generally. This method follows the spirit of McMichael’s strategy of ‘incorporating comparison’, 
whereby, through bringing otherwise disparate, temporally and geographically distinct moments 
within the word capitalist system into comparison, ‘in effect the “whole” emerges via 
comparative analysis of its “parts” as moments of a self-forming whole’, which ‘give[s] substance 
to a historical process’ (1990: 386) .  
 
In this case, the re-examination of what has generally been considered to be either an exception 
to the dominant narrative of neoliberalism’s development, or at least an incomplete fit – 
Australia from 1983-1996 – suggests the presence of a hitherto obscured agent in the roll-out of 
neoliberalism in that particular context. By bringing this into comparison with those countries 
often held to be exemplars of the neoliberal transformation, a new dimension to the ‘origins of 
neoliberalisation processes in the wake of the systemic crisis of the Keynesian geoinstitutional 
order’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010: 217).  
 Conclusion 
This article has argued that the dominant narrative regarding the development of neoliberalism 
misses the way that neoliberalism developed in Australia. There, from 1983 until 1996, the 
leadership of the political and industrial wings of the organised labour movement were in the 
vanguard of the roll out of a process of radical neoliberalisation. The article has also suggested 
that there is evidence that labour played an active role elsewhere in the early phases of the 
creation of neoliberalism, in those very countries in which the dominant narrative frames 
neoliberalism as being imposed upon labour by New Right political forces. Clearly this suggests 
that the dominant narrative regarding the role of conservative parties in the implementation of 
neoliberalism should be augmented by an analysis that recognises not only the ways that labour 
movements tried to resist neoliberalism, but also the ways that labour movements and parties 
were active agents in the construction of neoliberalism. Viewing the development of 
neoliberalism in this way also prompts reconsideration of what the central forces were that drove 
the development of neoliberalism, and what forces labour parties and movements were 
responding to that led them to pose neoliberalism as the solution. Whereas many accounts of the 
rise of neoliberalism have looked to the influence of fundamentalist neoliberal ideas articulated 
by various think tanks and intellectuals as the explanation for the neoliberal policy revolution, 
this account would seem more difficult to sustain once it is admitted that labour movements and 
parties, who had little contact with and/or hostility towards such institutions and intellectuals, 
were key agents of the neoliberal transformation. Given the persistence of neoliberalism in the 
wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, we argue that a reassessment of the origins of 
neoliberalism can contribute to a more satisfactory account of the neoliberalism’s content, 
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